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INTRODUCTION 
In Delaware, minority shareholders are a vulnerable category 
deserving special protections.  That is for good reason: minority 
shareholders, by definition, are part-owners of companies whose affairs are 
subject to the influence of controlling shareholders.  In these companies, 
the controlling shareholder has preponderant power because it holds most 
of the stock.  Such power is difficult to check.  Hence, Delaware courts 
have been––and remain––wary of actions taken by controlling 
shareholders.1 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (warning that the 
“specter of impropriety can never be completely eradicated” in going-private mergers, and 
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While this wariness has been consistent, the law surrounding 
controlling-shareholder actions has not.  And in the context of parent-
subsidiary mergers––or “going-private mergers”––the case law has been a 
battlefield rife with uncertainty for all parties involved.  However, on 
March 14, 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court extended an olive branch to 
those feuding.  The olive branch, in actuality, was the opinion provided in 
Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corporation.2  In M&F Worldwide (“MFW II”), 
the supreme court embraced Chancellor Strine’s controversial chancery 
court decision In re MFW Shareholders Litigation (“MFW I”), which held 
that if a going-private merger is approved by both a special committee of 
independent directors and a majority of the minority shareholders, the 
business judgment rule (“BJR”) will be the standard of review governing 
the transaction, rather than entire fairness. 3 
Background is required in order to appreciate the magnitude of this 
event.  When a controlling shareholder executes a going-private merger by 
acquiring the remaining stock in the company it controls, the process is ripe 
for abuse.  That is because the controlling shareholder sits on both sides of 
the transaction.  It sits on one side of the transaction, since it is the party 
proposing the merger.  The controlling shareholder sits on the other side of 
the transaction, since it has elected the majority of the target company’s 
board, which must vote in favor of the merger for it to go through.  Because 
the board is under the controlling shareholder’s thumb, the controlling 
shareholder, in effect, is the party that is both proposing and approving the 
merger. 
Accordingly, unless strict procedures are followed, going-private 
mergers constitute what Delaware and other courts term “self-dealing.”4  
Self-dealing poses a risk for minority shareholders because there is a 
realistic likelihood that the controlling shareholder will be primarily 
focused on its own interests while carrying out the transaction.  The classic 
scenario of abuse is when the controlling shareholder, “by virtue of its 
domination of the subsidiary, causes the subsidiary to act in such a way that 
 
additional judicial scrutiny is thus warranted); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical 
Foundation of the Common Law of Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 509 (2002) 
(describing how “this strain of thought [embodied in Tremont] was premised on the notion 
that when an 800-pound gorilla wants the rest of the bananas, little chimpanzees, like 
independent directors and minority stockholders, cannot be expected to stand in the way, 
even if the gorilla putatively gives them veto power”). 
 2.  88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).   
 3.  67 A.3d 496, 524-36 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 4.  See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (explaining 
that self-dealing occurs when a parent sits on both sides of a transaction with its subsidiary). 
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the parent receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and 
detriment to, the minority stockholders of the subsidiary.”5 
Because of the potential for abuse in going-private mergers, Delaware 
courts have, as a matter of course, employed entire fairness as the standard 
of review, pointing at Kahn v. Lynch as the doctrinal justification.6  In 
Lynch,7 the Delaware Supreme Court held that if a going-private merger is 
negotiated and recommended by a special, independent committee formed 
from members of the subsidiary’s board, the merger is subject to the entire 
fairness standard.8  Entire fairness is invasive because it entails scrutinizing 
all aspects of the transaction––both procedural and substantive––without 
deference to the controlling shareholder.9  Moreover, Lynch suggested that 
even if the merger was also approved by a majority of the minority 
shareholders, the standard of review would remain the same.10  The court 
thus led controlling shareholders to believe that they could not evade the 
entire fairness standard for judicial review of going-private mergers.  
Spawning from this belief has been the dominance of a transaction 
structure in which the going-private merger is negotiated and recommended 
by a special committee––something Lynch ruled was enough to shift the 
burden onto the plaintiffs to show that the merger was not entirely fair.11  
However, the controlling shareholder demands nothing more, since it likely 
faces entire fairness regardless of the procedures it follows.12 
However, in 2013 Chancellor Strine issued his opinion in MFW I, 
which forcefully challenged the status quo.  MFW I held that if a going-
private merger is conditioned from the outset on approval by both a special, 
independent committee, fully empowered to reject the deal, and the 
majority of the minority shareholders, the ultra-lax business judgment rule 
will apply.13  Since the opinion came from the chancery court, it 
represented an insurrection against Lynch’s hegemony.  When forced to 
determine the fate of the insurrection, the Delaware Supreme Court gave its 
approval and blessed Chancellor Strine’s bold decision.14 
 
 5.  Id.  
 6.  Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).   
 7.  Since there are many cases with “Kahn” as the first-named party, “Lynch” is how 
this case is conventionally referred to in the case law and otherwise.   
 8.  Id. at 1117. 
 9.  Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1117.   
 12.  Id. 
 13.  In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 500 (Del. Ch. 2013).  
 14.  Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (holding that the 
business judgment rule is the standard of review that governs going-private mergers 
between the controlling stockholder and its corporate subsidiary when the merger is 
conditioned on both the approval of an independent, adequately-empowered special 
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In this comment, I endorse the Delaware Supreme Court’s choice to 
uphold MFW I and demonstrate that it is part of a broader, desirable trend 
of pushback against Lynch––pushback principally arising from the 
chancery court.  I first highlight the differences between the BJR and entire 
fairness standards of review.  Second, I summarize the chancery court’s 
opinion in MFW I.  Third, I summarize the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
opinion in MFW II.  Fourth, I argue that MFW I and MFW II are best 
understood as a culmination of a larger movement in the case law, which 
reflected that Lynch, as commonly interpreted in the going-private merger 
context, was untenable. 
In the fifth section, I identify the reasons why it was proper, as a 
matter of law and policy, for the Delaware Supreme Court to uphold 
Chancellor Strine’s decision.  Specifically, I contend that upholding MFW I 
was necessary to reconcile the tension between the standard practice of 
applying the BJR to going-private tender offers and entire fairness to 
going-private mergers, despite the practical similarities between the two 
transactions.  Furthermore, because of MFW II, there will now be an 
incentive for controlling shareholders to structure going-private mergers in 
a manner ideal for protecting minority shareholders.  Finally, MFW II will 
initiate a positive change in the realm of securities litigation by deterring 
frivolous lawsuits.  In sum, these reasons serve as a strong defense of the 
recent Delaware Supreme Court opinion. 
I. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE OR ENTIRE FAIRNESS: WHY 
DOES IT MATTER? 
The crux of MFW I and MFW II was the selection of the BJR over 
entire fairness as the appropriate level of scrutiny for going-private 
mergers.  In order to understand the implications of this choice, it is 
important to discern the differences between the two principles.  Indeed, 
given the stark differences between the BJR and entire fairness, “[i]t is 
often of critical importance whether a particular decision is one to which 
the business judgment rule applies or the entire fairness rule applies.”15  
The BJR is the most relaxed standard of review that a court can apply to a 
corporate action.  It is essentially a standard of corporate liability by which 
a court reviews the actions of the members of a board of directors, who are 
bound by a “triad” of fiduciary duties: care, good faith, and loyalty.16  The 
 
committee that fulfills its duty of care, and the informed, uncoerced vote of a majority of 
minority stockholders).   
 15.  Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993). 
 16.  Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).  The duty of good 
faith is technically a subset of the duty of loyalty.  See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 
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BJR is predicated on the idea that boards of directors, unlike courts, 
possess expertise in their areas of business, and the courts should afford 
them wide latitude in making decisions.17  Accordingly, the BJR is a 
presumption that, in making a business decision, the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest 
belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company.18  
Moreover, the court presumes that the decision did not constitute fraud, 
illegality, ultra vires conduct, or waste.19 
To rebut the presumption, a shareholder “assumes the burden of 
providing evidence that directors, in reaching their challenged decision, 
breached . . . their fiduciary duty [of] good faith, loyalty, or due care.”20  To 
do so is very difficult; not even a showing of gross negligence is 
sufficient.21  Instead, a plaintiff must prove that a director or officer 
knowingly shirked his or her duties by, for example, “intentionally act[ing] 
with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the 
corporation . . .  act[ing] with the intent to violate applicable positive law, 
or . . . fail[ing] to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a 
conscious disregard for his duties.”22  Put simply, the court will not disturb 
a director or officer’s decision “if they can be attributed to any rational 
business purpose.”23  If a plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the BJR 
attaches to protect corporate officers.24  Given that the BJR bars meaningful 
judicial review of a corporation’s decisions and that it will attach absent 
extraordinary circumstances, the main effect of the BJR is to insulate 
corporations from liability.25 
By contrast, entire fairness is the most exacting standard of judicial 
review in Delaware.  As its name suggests, in applying entire fairness, the 
 
370 (Del. 2006) (noting that “the fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving a 
financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest.  It also encompasses cases where 
the fiduciary fails to act in good faith.”).   
 17.  See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 804, 811 (Del. 1984) (remarking that the 
BJR reflects the “cardinal precept . . . that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the 
business and affairs of the corporation”).   
 18.  Id. at 812. 
 19.  Id.  
 20.  Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361. 
 21.  See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66-68 (Del. 2006) 
(emphasizing how a showing of gross negligence is inadequate for rebutting the BJR). 
 22.  Id. at 67 (internal quotations and citation omitted).   
 23.  Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (emphasis added).   
 24.  Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361. 
 25.  See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (remarking that “liability 
is rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers simply for bad judgment and this 
reluctance to impose liability for unsuccessful business decisions has been doctrinally 
labelled [sic] the business judgment rule”).  
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court must determine whether the challenged decision was entirely fair for 
the shareholders.26  To do so, there must be an “examination of all aspects 
of the transaction,”27 with an eye to both procedural fairness and 
substantive fairness.28  Procedural fairness “embraces questions of when 
the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, 
disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the 
stockholders were obtained.”29  Substantive fairness “relates to the 
economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including 
all relevant factors:  assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and 
any other elements that affect the . . . value of a company’s stock.”30  Under 
entire fairness, the burden is initially on the defendant.31  However, if the 
defendant demonstrates that a well-functioning special committee of 
independent directors or a fully informed and uncoerced majority of the 
shareholders approved the transaction, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to 
show that the transaction was not entirely fair.32 
II. MFW I 
In MFW I, the Delaware Chancery Court confronted a question of first 
impression:  what standard of review should apply to a going-private 
merger conditioned from the outset by the controlling stockholder “on . . . 
both a properly empowered, independent committee and an informed, 
uncoerced majority-of-the minority vote . . . .”33  The choice was between 
the highly deferential BJR, which, absent extraordinary circumstances, 
would prevent the court from second guessing the actions of the controlling 
shareholder, and the plaintiff-friendly entire fairness standard.34  The 
controlling shareholder was MacAndrews & Forbes (“MacAndrews”), a 
holding company incorporated in Delaware.35  After purchasing the rest of 
the shares in MFW, its subsidiary, MacAndrews and members of MFW’s 
board were sued by a collection of former MFW shareholders, who had 
 
 26.  Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). 
 27.  Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 669 A.2d 79, 84 (Del. 1995). 
 28.  Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.  
 29.  Id.  
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994).  . 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  67 A.3d 496, 500 (Del. Ch. 2013) (emphasis in original).  
 34.  Id. at 523 n.131 (citing Tremont, 694 A.2d at 428). 
 35.  Id. at 499.   
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been squeezed out by the deal.36  The plaintiffs sought post-closing 
damages for breach of fiduciary duty.37 
Before the merger at issue, MacAndrews owned 43.4% of MFW.38  
MacAndrews itself was owned entirely by Ron Perelman.39  In May 2011, 
MacAndrews began exploring the possibility of taking MFW private.40  
MacAndrews hired an investment bank for advice on the issue, and the 
bank valued MFW’s shares at ten to thirty-two dollars a share.41  At the 
time, MFW was trading on the New York Stock Exchange in the twenty to 
twenty-four dollar range.42  By June 10, 2011, MFW’s shares closed at 
$16.96.43  The following business day, MacAndrews sent a proposal to the 
MFW board to buy the remaining shares for $24 in cash.44 
Critically, the proposal stipulated that MFW “will not move forward 
with the transaction unless it is approved by . . . a special committee [of 
independent MFW directors]. . . . [T]he transaction will be subject to a non-
waivable condition requiring the approval of a majority of the shares of the 
Company not owned by [MacAndrews].”45  The special committee was 
expected to objectively assess the merits of the deal for the minority 
shareholders and make a recommendation to them as to whether they 
should vote for or against it.46  MacAndrews emphasized that, whatever the 
recommendation of the committee, MacAndrews would maintain a positive 
relationship with MFW and remain a long-term stockholder.47 
In view of the proposal, the MFW board formed a special committee 
of independent directors and empowered it to: (1) investigate and evaluate 
MacAndrew’s proposal, (2) negotiate with MacAndrews over the terms of 
the transaction, subject to the understanding that the MFW board would 
need to approve any final agreement, and (3) make recommendations to the 
board and provide conclusions about whether the transaction is fair and in 
the best interest of the minority shareholders.48  The board agreed that it 
would not approve the transaction without a prior favorable 
recommendation of the special committee.49  It also permitted the 
 
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id. at 506. 
 41.  Id.  
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Id.  
 44.  Id.  
 45.  Id. (emphasis in original omitted). 
 46.  Id.  
 47.  Id.  
 48.  Id. at 507.  
 49.  Id.  
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committee to hire its own legal and financial advisers to assist in the 
undertaking.50 
So empowered, the committee went to work immediately, 
interviewing several potential financial advisers, before settling on 
Evercore Partners.51  With its financial adviser, the committee requested 
and received the most up-to-date financial data from MFW.52  Armed with 
the data, Evercore used sound accounting methods to generate a multitude 
of valuations of MFW in order to analyze the fairness of MacAndrews’ 
offer.53  After determining that MFW had been lowballed by MacAndrews, 
the special committee rejected the $24/share offer and counter-offered with 
$30/share.54  MacAndrews rejected the counteroffer, but, after some debate, 
made a “best and final” offer to MFW for $25/share.55  At the committee’s 
eighth and final meeting, Evercore declared that the price was fair.56  Based 
on this, the committee unanimously accepted the offer, and recommended 
it to the board.57  After the three board members affiliated with 
MacAndrews recused themselves, the eight other members also voted 
unanimously to accept MacAndrews’ offer.58  Given the committee’s 
conduct, the court ruled that “[t]he record is clear that the special 
committee met frequently and was presented with a rich body of financial 
information relevant to whether and at what price a going private 
transaction was advisable . . . .”59  Thus, “there is no triable issue of fact as 
to [the special committee’s] satisfaction of its duty of care.”60  Moreover, 
the composition of the committee was such that there was no uncertainty as 
to whether the committee was truly independent from MacAndrews.61 
Shortly after MFW’s board accepted MacAndrews’ offer, the 
stockholders were provided a proxy statement containing the history of the 
merger, including a summary of the negotiations between the special 
committee and MacAndrews, five separate ranges for the value of MFW’s 
stock that Evercore had produced using different financial analyses, and a 
recommendation that they vote in favor of the transaction.62  When the 
votes were counted on December 21, 2011, 65% of the shareholders other 
 
 50.  Id.  
 51.  Id. at 514.  
 52.  Id. at 514-15.  
 53.  Id. at 515.  
 54.  Id.  
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id. at 515-16.   
 59.  Id. at 516.   
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id. at 517-18.  
 62.  Id. at 516.  
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than MacAndrews––i.e., 65% of the minority shareholders––voted to 
accept the offer.63  In reviewing the vote, the court concluded that there was 
no triable issue of fact regarding whether the vote was fully informed and 
uncoerced––a point that the plaintiffs did not dispute.64 
In light of the special committee’s independence, the legitimacy of the 
minority shareholders’ vote, and the requirement that both conditions were 
necessary for the transaction, the court then considered what standard of 
review was appropriate.  Although the plaintiffs admitted that the Delaware 
Supreme Court had not directly answered this query, they nevertheless 
contended that its precedent demanded entire fairness.65  The plaintiffs 
cited the language in the ever-influential Lynch that commanded that a 
“controlling or dominating shareholder standing on both sides of a 
transaction, as in a parent-subsidiary context, bears the burden of proving 
its entire fairness.”66  The plaintiffs argued that this language was not only 
by itself sufficient to control the outcome of MFW I, but also the 
underlying principle had been affirmed in three subsequent supreme court 
cases,67 including Kahn v. Tremont Corp.,68 Emerald Partners v. Berlin,69 
and Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault (AMC).70 
Chancellor Strine denied that these four cases individually or 
collectively controlled MFW I.  Although the language from Lynch 
ostensibly mandated entire fairness, the court observed that the going-
private merger in Lynch was distinguishable because it was conditioned 
only on the approval of the special committee, not on the approval of the 
minority shareholders as well.71  Moreover, the special committee in Lynch, 
unlike MFW’s, was not capable of rejecting the transaction, since the 
controlling shareholder threatened to bypass the committee and make a 
tender offer to the minority shareholders at a lower price if the committee 
said no.72  Thus, Lynch was distinguishable from MFW I’s facts.73  The 
same could be said for Tremont and Emerald Partners, since the going-
private transactions in those cases also were not conditioned on the 
approval of the minority stockholders, but rather only on the special 
 
 63.  Id.  
 64.  Id. at 517.  
 65.  Id. at 520.   
 66.  Id. (quoting Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 
1994)).  
 67.  Id. 
 68.  694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997). 
 69.  726 A.2d 1215 (Del. 1999). 
 70.  51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012). 
 71.  MFW, 67 A.3d at 522.  
 72.  Id. (citing Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1118).   
 73.  Id.  
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committee’s approval.74  Finally, while it is true that AMC broadly 
proclaimed that “[w]hen a transaction involving self-dealing by a 
controlling shareholder is challenged, the applicable standard of judicial 
review is entire fairness,”75 the chancery court noted that the defendants 
had explicitly eschewed any argument that any standard of review other 
than entire fairness applied.76  Because the issue was not brought up in the 
chancery court,77 the Delaware Supreme Court in AMC did not need to 
consider the question presented in MFW I.  Since no Delaware Supreme 
Court precedent controlled, the MFW I court concluded that it had a free 
hand in choosing the outcome of the case.78 
With its free hand, the court pulled away from the general tradition of 
entire fairness in going-private mergers and decided that the BJR should 
apply.79  The court referenced the broad preference of the Delaware 
judiciary, which is not expert in business affairs, to defer to experienced 
directors and knowledgeable shareholders, whose money is at stake.80  This 
deference takes the form of the BJR, which is common to transactions that 
are not going-private mergers.81  Second, the dual protections for minority 
shareholders instituted by MacAndrews––approval by a special committee 
and vote by the majority of the minority shareholders––create an ideal 
model for going-private mergers, since each uniquely shields minority 
shareholders against abuse by the controlling shareholder.82  However, 
controlling shareholders would have no incentive to take both measures if 
their transactions were subject to entire fairness––the standard of review 
that would apply had they taken only one measure.83  Therefore, the BJR 
can be extended as a carrot to controlling shareholders so that, despite the 
added costs, they will structure going-private mergers in a way highly 
beneficial to minority shareholders.84  Third, and relatedly, the usual 
wariness of self-interested transactions that has led Delaware courts in 
 
 74.  Id. at 523 (citing Tremont, 694 A.2d at 429-30); The M&F Defendants’ Reply 
Brief in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, MFW, 67 A.3d 496 (Del. 
2013) (No. 6566-CS). 
 75. AMC, 51 A.3d at 1213. 
 76. MFW, 67 A.3d at 523-24 (citing In re Southern Peru Copper Corp. S’holder 
Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 766 (Del. Ch. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Americas Mining Corp. 
v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012)).   
 77.  Id. at 524.  
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 527-28.   
 80.  Id. at 526. 
 81.  Id. at 527. 
 82.  Id. at 527-28.   
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Id. at 528-29.   
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other contexts to routinely apply entire fairness has no place here.85  While 
abuse by controlling shareholders is indeed a palpable risk when robust 
safeguards do not exist, the presence of a strong special committee and 
majority of minority voting largely eliminates the chances of such abuse.86  
Thus, the court ruled that the merger between MFW and MacAndrews 
should be viewed through the lens of the BJR.87 
Since the BJR all but guarantees that a transaction under scrutiny will 
get the court’s seal of approval, Chancellor Strine preemptively stressed 
that the decision was not a broad fiat to corporations to freeze out minority 
shareholders without meaningful judicial oversight by simply asking for 
approval by a special committee and the majority of the minority.88  
Instead, to enjoy the laxity of the BJR: (1) the controlling shareholder must 
condition from the outset the procession of the deal on these two measures; 
(2) the special committee must be independent; (3) the committee must be 
empowered to freely select its own advisors and to say no definitively; (4) 
the committee must meet its duty of care; (5) the vote of the minority must 
be informed; and (6) there must be no coercion of the minority.89  Only 
then will the BJR apply. 
Turning to the merits of the plaintiffs’ case, Chancellor Strine applied 
the BJR and awarded summary judgment for the defendants on all claims.90  
The plaintiffs appealed the decision and the Delaware Supreme Court heard 
their appeal in MFW II. 
III. MFW II 
In MFW II, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld Chancellor Strine’s 
opinion at the chancery court.  It affirmed that the BJR is the standard of 
review that should govern mergers between a controlling shareholder and 
its subsidiary, “where the merger is conditioned ab initio upon both 
approval by an independent, adequately-empowered Special Committee 
that fulfills its duty of care; and the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority 
of the minority stockholders.”91  The court rested its decision on four 
considerations.  First, the court noted that “entire fairness is the highest 
standard of review in corporate law,” and is appropriate when a controlling 
shareholder has potentially undermined the protections afforded by a 
 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id. at 528-29, 532-33, 535. 
 87.  Id. at 536.  
 88.  Id. at 533-36. 
 89.  Id. at 535.  
 90.  Id. at 536.  
 91.  Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014). 
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disinterested board and shareholder approval.92  Yet, that “undermining 
influence does not exist in every controlled merger setting,” and “[t]he 
simultaneous deployment of the procedural protections employed [by the 
defendant] here create[s] a countervailing, offsetting influence of equal––if 
not greater––force.”93  That is, when the controller “irrevocably and 
publicly disables itself from using its control to dictate the outcome of the 
negotiations and shareholder vote,” the going-private merger acquires the 
characteristics of a third-party, arm’s-length merger, which is reviewed 
under the BJR.94 
Second, the court agreed with Chancellor Strine that the merger 
structure encouraged by MFW I “optimally protects” the minority 
shareholders in a going-private merger.95  Third, the use of the BJR as the 
standard of review in a going-private merger conditioned on approval by 
both a special committee and the majority-of-the-minority shareholders “is 
consistent with the central tradition of Delaware law, which defers to the 
informed decisions of impartial directors, especially when those decisions 
have been approved by the disinterested stockholders on full information 
and without coercion.”96  The final consideration that led the court to 
uphold MFW I was that these dual protections would assure a fair price for 
the minority shareholders.  Under entire fairness review, obtaining the right 
price for minority shareholders is the “preponderant” concern, and the risk 
of them not getting the right price in a self-dealing scenario is the major 
justification for the heightened standard of review.97  However, since the 
dual-protections in play in the instant case would also ensure an acceptable 
price for minority shareholders, there is no point of imposing entire fairness 
when they are present.98 
Thus, on these grounds, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the legal 
standard propounded in MFW I, holding that a going-private merger 
conditioned from the outset on approval by both an independent, fully 
empowered special committee and an uncoerced, informed majority-of-the-
minority will be subject to the BJR rather than entire fairness.99  Applying 
this standard to the facts of the case at hand, the Delaware Supreme Court 
found in favor of the defendant, MacAndrews.100  It determined that 
MacAndrews indeed conditioned its offer upon dual procedural 
 
 92.  Id.  
 93.  Id.  
 94.  Id.  
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 644-45. 
 98.  Id. at 645.  
 99.  Id. at 644. 
 100.  Id. at 646-47. 
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protections.101  Also, the special committee used by MacAndrews was truly 
independent and effective.102  Finally, the vote of the majority of the 
minority was uncoerced and fully informed.103  Therefore, with the case 
being reviewed through the lens of the BJR, MacAndrews was entitled to 
summary judgment.104 
IV. THE EROSION OF LYNCH: HOW MFW I AND MFW II FIT INTO 
THE CASE LAW 
Despite first appearances, the MFW opinions are not an aberration.  
Although Chancellor Strine and the Delaware Supreme Court broke from 
the tradition of entire fairness in controlling-shareholder transactions, MFW 
I and II are best understood as a broader undercurrent against the old model 
of judicial review underpinned by Lynch.  While the influence of Lynch is 
still heavy, the footprint that it left in the case law had begun to wear away 
before MFW I, particularly within the chancery court.105  Long before MFW 
was decided in May 2013, two major and oft-cited opinions, In re Siliconix 
Shareholders Litigation106 and Glassman v. Unocal Exploration 
Company,107 were issued.  These cases and their progeny, as well as In re 
Cox Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,108 provided a vital 
foundation for MFW I and MFW II.  Thus, rather than being a monumental, 
but sui generis, event, MFW I and MFW II are a culmination of a wider 
movement. 
A. The Lynch Footprint 
Since being decided in 1995, Lynch has cast a shadow across all 
transactions involving controlling shareholders.  Lynch’s main contribution 
to the canon of Delaware case law was clarifying, for a time, what standard 
of review applies to a going-private merger that is negotiated by a special 
committee of independent members of the subsidiary’s board.  The court in 
Lynch adopted the position that the presence and activity of the special 
committee only shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff within the entire 
 
    101.   Id. at 654. 
    102.   Id. at 647-53 
    103.   Id. at 653-54. 
 104.  Id. at 654 
 105.  Aside from Unocal, the cases discussed in this section have not been reviewed by 
the Delaware Supreme Court.  
 106.  In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CIV. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. 
Ch. June 19, 2001). 
 107.  Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001). 
 108.  In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
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fairness analysis and does not afford the defendant the protections of the 
BJR.109  Moreover, the court employed broad language, implying that even 
if a majority of the minority shareholders approved the deal negotiated by 
the committee, entire fairness would still be the standard of review.  It 
articulated that “[a] controlling . . . shareholder standing on both sides of a 
transaction . . . bears the burden of proving its entire fairness,” and “[e]ntire 
fairness remains the proper focus of judicial analysis in examining an 
interested merger . . . because the unchanging nature of the underlying 
‘interested’ transaction requires careful scrutiny.”110  These two statements 
in conjunction with the court’s declaration that “an approval of the 
transaction by an independent committee . . . or an informed majority of 
minority shareholders [only] shifts the burden of proof” appeared to 
foreclose the BJR even when both measures are taken––a holding contrary 
to MFW I and II, and, as later discussed, Cox Communications.111 
Lynch was hardly the first case to entrench entire fairness as the 
mainstay in going-private mergers.  Entire fairness had been a protection 
for minority shareholders since 1952, when the Delaware Supreme Court 
held in Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corporation112 and Gotlieb v. Heyden 
Chemical Corporation113 that interested transactions with controlling 
shareholders can be reassessed by the courts if they believe the price to be 
unfair.  While there was some debate in the case law before Lynch about 
the absoluteness of this rule114–– a debate that Lynch essentially quashed––
many opinions were steadfast in their commitment to entire fairness.  For 
example, in Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Company, the court affirmed that “[t]he 
requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands 
on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire 
fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.”115  
Thus, Lynch, along with other case law supporting it, has been extremely 
influential precedent.  But, recently pushback has been developing. 
 
 109.  Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994).   
 110.  Id. at 1115-16. 
 111.  This, of course, hinges on whether the use of “or” in this statement was intentional.  
Given the rest of Lynch and the fact that the there was no majority of minority condition in 
Lynch (and thus this statement was not relating to the facts at hand), it is difficult to say.  
However, “and” may well have been intended.  
 112.  Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109 (1952). 
 113.  Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 58 (1952). 
 114.  See, e.g., In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CIV. A. 9844, 1988 
WL 111271 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988) (holding that if there is a special committee, the BJR 
applies rather than entire fairness).   
 115.  Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985) (quoting Weinberger, 
457 A.2d at 710).  
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B. The Siliconix Line of Cases 
In Siliconix, the defendant, Vishay Intertechnology (“Vishay”), sought 
to purchase through a tender offer the 19.6% of its subsidiary, Siliconix, 
that it did not already own.116  The consideration for the purchase was to be 
in stock.117  Before the deal could be either accepted or rejected by the 
minority shareholders, an individual who held shares in Siliconix sued, 
seeking a preliminary injunction.118  He alleged that the Siliconix board 
failed to properly analyze the tender offer and make an informed 
recommendation to the minority shareholders about whether or not to 
accept the offer.119  The plaintiff also claimed that the board was 
responsible for Vishay offering too low of a price, since it did not 
adequately reveal the basis for Vishay’s valuations of Siliconix.120  Because 
of these failures, the plaintiff contended that Vishay breached its fiduciary 
duty to the minority shareholders and that the breach should be reviewed 
under entire fairness.121  The plaintiff asserted that the transaction would 
fail entire fairness scrutiny since it was procedurally and substantively 
unfair under the Weinberger standard.122  Accordingly, the court should 
impose the requested preliminary injunction against the transaction.123 
The court, however, rebuffed the plaintiff’s argument that entire 
fairness applies to tender offers and opted instead to apply the BJR.124  In 
doing so, the court acknowledged that “[i]t may seem strange that the 
scrutiny given to tender offer transactions is less than the scrutiny that may 
be given to . . . a merger transaction.”125  After all, once a parent obtains at 
least 90% of its subsidiary’s shares through a tender offer, it will almost 
invariably carry out a short-form merger to acquire the remaining 10%.  
Thus, for those minority shareholders who do not tender, they may well 
“end up in the same position as if . . . [they] had tendered or if the 
transaction had been structured as a merger”126––that is, they will lose their 
shares in the subsidiary, possibly against their will. 
 
 116.  In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CIV. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *1 
(Del. Ch. June 19, 2001). 
 117.  Id.  
 118.  Id. at *6. 
 119.  Id.  
 120.  Id. at *12-13.   
 121.  Id. at *6.  
 122.  Id.  See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (highlighting that 
entire fairness has two components: procedural fairness––“fair dealing”––and substantive 
fairness––“fair price”).   
 123.  In re Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *6  
 124.  Id.  
 125.  Id. at *7.  
 126.  Id.  
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Nevertheless, the court found that, despite Lynch and the convention 
of entire fairness for controlling shareholder transactions, entire fairness 
was inappropriate because of “two simple concepts.”127  First, although 
minority shareholders who do not tender may lose their shares through a 
likely short-form merger anyway, they at least hang onto their shares in the 
meantime.128  Second, tender offers, unlike merger proposals, are made 
directly to the minority shareholders, rather than the target’s board.129  
Thus, there is no self-dealing in the form of a controller reaching an 
agreement with the board it controls.130  Since self-dealing is one 
consideration that militates in favor of entire fairness in going-private 
mergers, its absence in the tender-offer context renders entire fairness less 
appropriate.131  Another consideration––“fair price”––is also irrelevant in 
the tender-offer context because minority shareholders are free to accept or 
decline the tender offer according to their individual assessment of its 
propriety.132  In short, the court concluded that “as long as the tender offer 
is pursued properly, the free choice of the minority shareholders to reject 
the tender offer provides sufficient protection.”133  Thus, Siliconix held, for 
the first time ever in Delaware, that entire fairness did not apply to tender 
offers.  This decision bifurcated the path controlling shareholders must take 
to go private.  Before Siliconix, a controlling shareholder was, pursuant to 
Lynch, confined to a merger subject to entire fairness.  However, after 
Siliconix, a controlling shareholder could pursue an alternative: a tender 
offer subject to the BJR.  At once, this limited the reach of Lynch. 
The contours of Siliconix were clarified in In re Pure Resources, Inc., 
Shareholders Litigation.134  Again in the context of a going-private tender 
offer, the court considered what standard of review applied.135  The court 
held that the mere fact that the controlling shareholder elected to take the 
Siliconix path did not liberate it from meaningful judicial review.136  In the 
court’s mind, the concerns expressed in Lynch about abuse by controlling 
shareholders could only be given “proper effect”––that is, remedied––if 
certain safeguards exist.137  Three safeguards are required for entire fairness 
 
 127.  Id.  
 128.  Id.  
   129.    Id. 
   130.    Id.  
 131.  Id.  
 132.  Id. at *6.  See also Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996) 
(finding that the “fair price” requirement of entire fairness does not apply to non-controlling 
shareholder tender offers).   
 133.  Id.  
 134.  808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002). 
   135.    Id. at 424, 433  
 136.  Id. at 444-46.  
 137.  Id. at 445.  
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to apply: (1) the tender offer must be bound by a non-waivable majority of 
the minority tender condition; (2) the controlling shareholder must promise 
to consummate a prompt short-form merger at the same price if it gets more 
than 90% of the shares; and (3) the controller must not make any 
“retributive threats.”138  These safeguards provide “equitable 
reinforcement” to the potential for coercion and unfairness posed by 
controlling-shareholder transactions.139 
The court in In re CNX Gas Corp. Shareholders Litigation further 
reinforced the shift away from entire fairness.140  There, the court added 
another requirement to the three mandated by Pure Resources: if a 
controlling shareholder seeks entire fairness for its going-private tender 
offer, the tender offer must also be negotiated and recommended by a 
special committee of independent directors.141  Importantly, the 
subsidiary’s board needs to confer onto the special committee authority 
comparable to what it would have in a third-party transaction, where there 
is no controlling shareholder.  This includes the authority to seek different 
transactions and to adopt a rights plan “to provide the subsidiary with time 
to respond, negotiate, and develop alternatives” to the tender offer.142  Such 
authority is vital to protecting the minority shareholders.143 
C. Cox Communications 
Whereas Siliconix, Pure Resources, and CNX Gas addressed the 
standard of review for tender offers by controlling shareholders, Cox 
Communications144 moved the debate squarely to going-private mergers.  In 
the case, the Cox Family (“the Family”) controlled 74% of Cox 
Communications.145  By summer 2004, the Family decided it would seek 
the remaining shares that it did not own and take Cox private again.146  
After a meeting with the Cox board in which the Family previewed its 
ambitions, the Family made it clear that it would require a special 
committee of independent directors to respond to and negotiate its 
impending proposal.147  The Family did not make any threats about what 
 
 138.  Id.  
 139.  Id.  
 140.  4 A.3d 397 (Del. Ch. 2010).   
 141.  Id. at 413.  
 142.  Id. at 415.  
 143.  Id.  
 144.  879 A.2d 604 (Del Ch. 2005). 
 145.  Id. at 607.  
 146.  Id.  
 147.  Id.  
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would happen if the special committee rejected the deal.148  On the same 
day that the proposal was announced, August 2, 2004, the minority 
shareholders sued Cox and the Family, alleging breaches of fiduciary 
duty.149  The allegations centered on the notions that the Family had 
undervalued Cox and was trying to enrich itself, and that Cox’s board was 
merely acquiescing to the Family’s suspect wishes.150  Amidst the 
litigation, Cox’s board formed the special committee as demanded by the 
Family’s proposal.151  After lengthy negotiations, the Family reached an 
agreement for $34.75/share, up from the initial offer of $32/share.152  The 
agreement was conditioned on approval by a majority of the minority 
shareholders and a settlement of all outstanding lawsuits.153  While there 
were no objections by any party to the settlement, several minority 
shareholders challenged the plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees, which 
amounted to millions of dollars, and, as part of the settlement, the Family 
agreed not to oppose.154 
While the court’s opinion on the attorneys’ fees, authored by 
Chancellor Strine, is irrelevant here, it is noteworthy how the court, in 
dicta, used this issue as a platform for inveighing against the system of 
judicial review for going-private mergers.  The court’s remarks were 
prompted by its perception that Lynch generates undue litigation costs for 
defendants––plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees being one such example.155  The 
court acknowledged that Lynch created a “useful incentive” for controlling 
shareholders to use a special committee to negotiate going-private mergers, 
since use of the committee shifts the burden within entire fairness to the 
plaintiffs.156  Yet the court lamented how Lynch simultaneously dis-
incentivized the use of a majority of the minority voting condition, because 
fulfilling such a condition would not yield any benefits to the controlling 
shareholder.157  After all, entire fairness would still apply.158  As the court 
described, “[f]rom a controller’s standpoint, accepting this condition from 
the inception of the negotiating process added an element of transactional 
 
 148.  Id.  
   149.    Id. at 608.  
 150.  Id.  
 151.  Id. at 609. 
 152.  Id. at 612. 
 153.  Id.  
 154.  Id. at 612-13.  
 155.  Id. at 614-15.  
 156.  Id. at 618. 
 157.  Id.   
 158.  Although Lynch did not expressly state this, that has been the conventional 
understanding and, of course, it would be risky and expensive for a controller to hold itself 
out as a “test balloon” to see if it holds true.  Hence, the special committee-only model for 
going-private mergers became entrenched.   
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risk without much liability-insulating compensation in exchange.”159  Lynch 
thus generated a world in which special committees alone are used in 
going-private mergers.160  This is not ideal for minority shareholders, since 
they are less protected than they might otherwise be. 
Furthermore, it is not ideal for defendants––the next point that the 
court drives home.  Because entire fairness, by its very nature, demands a 
highly invasive judicial inquiry into the fairness of the price the controlling 
shareholder offered the minority shareholders, upon being sued, the 
controlling shareholder cannot even get the most unmeritorious cases 
dismissed.161  A plaintiff, simply by claiming that the price was unfair, can 
survive a motion to dismiss, “because financial fairness is a debatable issue 
and the plaintiff has at least a colorable position.”162  Accordingly, it is 
rational for controlling shareholders to simply settle, since it would likely 
be cheaper than covering the costs of bringing the case up to summary 
judgment––costs that include the waste of executives’ time.163 
The solution, in Chancellor Strine’s estimation, was exactly what he 
had a chance to rule on in MFW I:  when a merger with a controlling 
shareholder is (1) negotiated and approved by a special committee of 
independent directors and (2) conditioned on an affirmative vote of a 
majority of the minority stockholders, the court should apply the BJR.164  
Although in Cox Communications this prescription was contained only 
within dicta, it exerted deep influence on the practical answer to standard of 
review question.  Beyond, of course, MFW I, the court in CNX Gas 
explicitly stated that it had applied Chancellor Strine’s recommendation in 
Cox Communications to arrive at its conclusion that a tender offer will be 
subject to the BJR if, among other things, it is conditioned on the existence 
of a special, independent committee and approval by a majority of the 
minority shareholders.165  It did so despite the obvious fact that Cox 
Communications did not speak to the same set of facts––CNX Gas tackled 
a tender offer––and, regardless, one chancery court opinion is not binding 
upon another. 
 
 159.  Id.  
 160.  Id. at 619.  
 161.  Id. at 620.  
 162.  Id.  
 163.  Id.  
 164.  Id. at 606.  
 165.  In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 400 (Del. Ch. 2010).   
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D. Unocal 
Unocal also chipped away the edifice constructed by Lynch in the 
merger context.  In Unocal, the court considered what standard of review 
applied to a “short-form” merger.166  Short-form mergers, which are 
governed by Section 253 of the Delaware Corporate Law, permit a 
controlling shareholder that owns at least 90% of the shares of a subsidiary 
to merge the subsidiary into itself through a simple administrative process, 
thereby removing the minority shareholders.167  The plaintiffs, who were 
minority shareholders in UXC––Unocal’s 96%-owned subsidiary––
challenged the short-form merger between Unocal and UXC, arguing that 
Unocal and its directors on UXC’s board did not engage in fair dealing.168  
Mindful of Lynch’s warnings about abuse by controlling shareholders in 
interested transactions, the court was confronted with the choice of either 
limiting the breadth of Lynch or possibly defeating the legislature’s purpose 
in creating the short-form merger:  providing controlling shareholders with 
an expedited process for squeezing out minority shareholders.169  Whatever 
the ostensible sweep of Lynch, the court ruled that entire fairness did not 
apply.170  Accordingly, controlling shareholders in short-form mergers 
would be freed from complying with the procedural demands of entire 
fairness, such as setting up a negotiating committee and hiring independent 
financial and legal experts––procedures that help protect minority 
shareholders. 
V. DESIRABLE RESISTANCE: WHY MFW I AND II GOT IT RIGHT 
The previous section described how MFW I and II, despite first 
appearances, were not a one-off challenge to Lynch, but rather the most 
graphic illustration of broader resistance to Lynch’s influence.  Now, I will 
shift from the positive to the normative.  The Delaware Supreme Court 
properly upheld MFW I for three reasons.  First, it bridges the deep divide 
between the treatment of going-private tender offers and going-private 
mergers.  Second, it incentivizes a going-private merger structure that is 
optimal for minority shareholders.  Third, it will inevitably initiate a 
positive change in the realm of securities litigation by reducing frivolous 
 
 166.  Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 247 (Del. 2001).   
 167.  See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 253 (2010) (stating, “by executing, acknowledging and 
filing . . . a certificate of such ownership and merger setting forth a copy of the resolution of 
its board of directors to so merge and the date of the adoption”).   
 168.  Unocal, 777 A.2d at 244.  
 169.  Id. at 247-48.  
 170.  Id. 
WILSON_FINAL (ARTICLE 7) .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2015  5:47 PM 
2015] DESIRABLE RESISTANCE 663 
 
lawsuits.  Therefore, the Delaware Supreme Court correctly upheld 
Chancellor Strine’s opinion. 
A. Doctrinal Coherence 
The first reason that MFW should be upheld is to reconcile the 
doctrinal tension between Lynch, on the one hand, and the Siliconix line of 
cases, on the other.  As discussed, there are dramatic differences between 
entire fairness and the BJR.171  Yet there are not dramatic differences 
between a going-private merger and a going-private tender offer followed 
by a short-form merger––in fact, they are practically similar.172  Thus, the 
tension becomes:  why are comparable transactions reviewed under 
radically different standards?  The court itself in Pure Resources, which 
built on Siliconix, was “troubled by [this] imbalance in Delaware 
law . . . .”173  In In re Cysive, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, the court called 
the imbalance downright “strange.”174  Delaware’s application of entire 
fairness to mergers and the BJR to tender offers is disconcerting from the 
uncontroversial standpoint that the law should make sense and not be 
arbitrary.  However, the concern is not purely academic; if Lynch was 
motivated by worries that controlling shareholders may exercise their 
power to the detriment of minority shareholders, and the Siliconix line of 
cases, while departing from Lynch, also expressed that same fear, then one 
would hope that minority shareholders would be amply protected by the 
courts whatever method of going private was chosen. 
Although CNX Gas made significant headway in protecting minority 
shareholders in the tender offer context by holding that the BJR would only 
apply if:  (1) the tender offer is negotiated and recommended by a special 
committee of independent directors; (2) the tender offer is conditioned on 
majority of the minority approval; (3) the controlling shareholder 
consummates a prompt short-form merger at the same price if it gets more 
than 90% of the shares; and (4) the controller does not make any retributive 
 
   171.    See supra Section I (discussing the differences between the BJR and entire fairness 
standards of review). 
 172.  See, e.g., In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CIV. A. 18700, 2001 WL 
716787, at *7 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001) (noting how the “[minority] shareholders may reject 
the tender, but, if the tender is successful and the short-form merger accomplished, the 
shareholder . . . will end up in the same position as if he or she had tendered or if the 
transaction had been structured as a merger . . . .”) (emphasis added); Ronald J. Gilson & 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 824 
n.160 (2003) (flagging the “thinness of the distinction between the transactional 
forms . . . .”).   
 173.  In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 443 (Del. Ch. 2002).   
 174.  In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 547 (Del. Ch. 2003).  
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threats,175 there remained a disconnect with the judiciary’s treatment of 
mergers.  If the transaction being negotiated and recommended by a 
special, independent committee and approved by the majority of the 
minority was sufficient to insulate the minority shareholders from the 
controller’s abuse in the tender offer context, why would these procedures 
not do the same for minority shareholders in a going-private merger? 
The answer is that they should.  Thus, MFW II, in declaring that a 
going-private merger negotiated and accepted by a special committee and 
approved by a majority of the minority is subject to the BJR, bridges the 
doctrinal divide between Lynch and the Siliconix line of cases.  Unifying 
the two sides is the principle that, when these measures are taken, 
regardless of what form the transaction takes, the controlling shareholder 
and the controlled board have replicated an “arm’s-length” bargain and 
thus the transaction is not conflicted and does not constitute self-dealing.  
Accordingly, the BJR should apply, just as it applies in situations in which 
the takeover is being attempted by a third party.176 
Relatedly, MFW II provided the Delaware Supreme Court with an 
opportunity to whole-heartedly join the movement against Lynch and quell 
the uncertainty at the chancery court about what the supreme court might 
do with the chancery court’s decisions in this area.  With the exception of 
Unocal, the supreme court had not spoken on the derogation of Lynch’s 
authority begot by the Siliconix line of cases, among others.  With the 
doctrinal incoherence having simmered for years, the court, by upholding 
MFW I, put its seal of approval on Chancellor Strine’s solution.  Had the 
Delaware Supreme Court overruled MFW I and blessed the differing 
treatment of going-private tender offers and going-private mergers, then 
Delaware would be left with a distinction in the law that is unjustified.  
Therefore, MFW I was properly upheld. 
B. Protecting Minority Shareholders 
The second reason that it was beneficial for the Delaware Supreme 
Court to endorse MFW I is that it creates an incentive to structure mergers 
in a manner optimally protective of minority shareholders.  Based on the 
standard reading of Lynch, with its expansive statements about the 
propriety of entire fairness for self-dealing transactions, controlling 
shareholders believed that entire fairness would apply regardless of what 
measures they took in going-private mergers.  Moreover, based on this 
 
 175.  In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 413 (Del. Ch. 2010).  
 176.  See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) 
(recognizing that “the business judgment rule, including the standards by which director 
conduct is judged, is applicable in the context of a [non-controlling shareholder] takeover”).   
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same reading, if a going-private merger was negotiated and recommended 
by a special, independent committee and approved by the majority of the 
minority, the controlling shareholder would be in no better position than if 
the committee alone had endorsed the deal; either way, the controlling 
shareholder would face entire fairness and the burden would merely be 
shifted to the plaintiff.177  Thus, as the court noted in Cox Communications, 
“[a]s a practical matter . . . the effect of Lynch in the real world . . . was to 
generate the use of special committees alone.”178 
However, minority shareholders would certainly benefit from the dual 
protections prescribed in Cox Communications and found to be sufficient to 
warrant the BJR in MFW I.  The power of a special negotiating committee 
as a formidable roadblock to controlling shareholder abuse has long been 
appreciated, including, of course, by the Delaware Supreme Court.  In 
Weinberger, for example, where the controlling shareholder did not use a 
special committee to negotiate the going-private merger, the court lamented 
that “the result here could have been entirely different if [the controller] 
had appointed an independent negotiating committee,” since that would be 
equivalent to “conduct by a theoretical, wholly independent, board of 
directors . . . exerting its bargaining power against the other at arm’s 
length . . . .”179  Approval by the majority of the minority is also powerful, 
though not dispositive, in its own right.  Combined with MFW’s 
requirement that the controlling shareholder cannot coerce the minority 
shareholders if it seeks the fruits of the BJR,180 the vote provides an 
effective check on the special committee––a safeguard against the peril that 
the committee either erred in its judgment or was somehow suborned by 
the controller. 
 Furthermore, as the court expounded in Cox Communications, a 
going-private merger blessed both by the independent directors and the 
majority of the minority is vital, since [the two are] complementary and not 
substitutes.  The first element is important because the directors have the 
capability to act as effective and active bargaining agents, which 
disaggregated shareholders do not.  But, because bargaining agents are not 
 
 177.  See supra Section IV.A (discussing the “Lynch Footprint”); see also Guhan 
Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 17 (2005) (concluding that, “from a 
transactional lawyer’s perspective, merger-freezeout doctrine after Lynch . . . represents the 
worst of all possible worlds:  a fully empowered [special committee] and a feisty negotiation 
with the controller, to be followed nevertheless with entire fairness review by the court, 
even if minority shareholders have approved the deal”).   
 178. In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 619 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 179. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983). 
 180. In re MFW S’holder Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 536 (Del. Ch. 2013).   
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always effective or faithful, the second element is critical, because it gives 
the minority stockholders the opportunity to reject their agents’ work.181 
Even the MFW plaintiffs acknowledged that this transactional 
structure is the ideal one for minority stockholders.182  Thus, the 
combination of safeguards, incentivized by MFW I, is a particularly potent 
force in protecting minority shareholders.  Given that the combination 
would continue to not be used if the Delaware Supreme Court had 
overruled MFW I and held that the BJR always applies in going-private 
mergers, the Delaware Supreme Court made the correct decision––one that 
will inherently ward off abuse by controlling shareholders. 
C. Changing the Landscape of Securities Litigation 
The third reason that the outcome in MFW II is desirable is that it will 
positively transform the landscape of securities litigation.  One effect of the 
standard interpretation of Lynch––that the standard of review should 
always be entire fairness for going-private mergers––was that it enabled 
frivolous lawsuits.  The dilemma was that, when a plaintiff sued, alleging 
that a going-private merger was unfair, it was virtually impossible for the 
defendant to make the case go away at the pleading stage.  This is because 
of the “factual intensiveness of the financial fairness determination,” which 
“will generally preclude dismissal or [even] summary judgment in such 
cases.”183  Any allegation that the transaction is not fair will survive a 
motion to dismiss, since it raises a triable issue of fact, and under Lynch, 
there is no need to plead particularized facts demonstrating unfairness. 
Summary judgment was also similarly hopeless for the defendant.  As 
the court commented in Cysive, “the determination of whether the burden 
should shift under the Lynch doctrine is the kind of decision that can 
usually be made . . . at the earliest, on undisputed facts that have emerged 
from a discovery record.”184  At the summary judgment stage, where all 
inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party based on that record, 
it is highly improbable that the controlling shareholder would be able to 
convince that court, for example, that there is zero dispute whether the 
special committee had real bargaining power, whether the committee was 
unduly influenced by the controller, and whether the committee complied 
with its fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.185 
Hence, every single case, however unmeritorious, has settlement 
 
 181.  Id. at 606.  
 182.  Id. at 527.  
 183.  In re Cysive, Inc. S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 548 n.19 (Del. Ch. 2003).  
 184.  Id. at 548.  
 185.  Id.  
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value.  That the terms of a going-private merger are irrelevant to whether 
litigation is brought is poignantly illustrated by the fact that plaintiffs, as a 
matter of course, sue long before the committee has agreed to or even 
received the controlling shareholder’s proposed terms.186  Thus, plaintiff 
firms reflexively file suit when the controller merely makes public its 
intention to propose a deal, using almost entirely boilerplate complaints, 
which they later have to amend to incorporate the actual details of the 
proposal.  The reflexive nature of the exercise is further confirmed by the 
fact that, in 2012, multiple shareholder suits were brought to challenge 93% 
of M&A deals with a value over $100 million, and 96% of M&A deals 
with a value over $500 million.187  While some of these suits undoubtedly 
have merit, it utterly strains credulity that unfairness is near universal to 
such transactions, especially when the defendants would know in advance 
that plaintiff firms would be watching their every move. 
That the terms of a going-private merger do not matter is further 
verified by the fact that plaintiffs universally acquiesce to whatever price 
per share the special committee agrees to with the controlling 
shareholder.188  They do so by accepting the price as part of the litigation 
settlement and signing a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) 
declaring that the price is fair.189  To appreciate the farcical nature of this 
practice, the ritualistic process of challenging a going-private merger must 
be further highlighted.  The process is as follows:  a plaintiff sues when the 
controlling shareholders’ intention to go private is announced; naturally, 
the controlling shareholder, when it initially offers a price for its subsidiary, 
does not offer the maximum that it would be willing to pay, since that 
would weaken its negotiating position; after negotiating with the special 
 
 186.  See, e.g., ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, 
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 1 (2012), available at 
https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/9d8fd78f-7807-485a-a8fc-
4ec4182dedd6/2012-Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-M-and-A.pdf (finding that in 2012, 
M&A shareholder suits were filed an average of fourteen days after the merger 
announcement and sometimes “within hours” of the merger announcement); see also In re 
Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 620 (Del. Ch. 2005) (observing that, 
“Instead of suing once a controller actually signs up a merger agreement with a special 
committee of independent directors, plaintiffs sue as soon as there is a public announcement 
of the controller’s intention to propose a merger”––something that is “typical.”) 
 187.  Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 620.  This figure includes M&A deals in which there 
are not controlling shareholders.  Since the presence of a controller makes it that much more 
likely that the deal would be challenged, these figures for going-private mergers would 
likely be even higher. 
   188.    Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware 
Law (Mis)shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1817 (2004) (noting 
that shareholders typically “go[] through the motions”). 
 189.  Id. at 1818.  
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committee, the price that the controlling shareholder agrees to pay is 
always higher than its initial offer; because the price paid is higher than the 
price proposed, the plaintiffs’ attorneys contend that their suit is 
responsible for the difference and thus their suit benefited the minority 
shareholders; the controlling shareholder and plaintiffs’ attorneys, as part 
of the settlement, sign a MOU stating that the plaintiffs’ attorneys deserve 
credit for the increase and that the price paid is indeed fair; and, finally, the 
court will award attorney’s fees based on this “added value” that the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys generated.190 
The plaintiffs’ attorneys have no incentive to further challenge the 
fairness of the price agreed to by the special committee, because they 
would have little or nothing to gain from doing so, and their costs––in the 
form of time and effort trying to convince the court that the price was 
unfair––are significant.191  Thus, the plaintiffs do not care whether the price 
agreed to is fair.  They only care that the price is higher than what was 
proposed after they filed suit, since that is what will form the foundation 
for their fees! 
Accordingly, as Elliot Weiss and Lawrence White bluntly put it, 
Lynch “appears to have had the effect of encouraging plaintiffs’ attorneys 
to settle cases challenging squeeze outs, largely without regard to whether 
the merger terms agreed to by a [special negotiating committee] are entirely 
fair.”192  Indeed, as the court in Cox Communications noted, despite its 
challenge to the instant plaintiffs to do so, they were unable “to point to one 
instance in the precise context of a case of this kind (i.e. cases started by 
attacks on negotiable going-private proposals) of the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
refusing to settle once a special committee has agreed on price with a 
controller.”193  They were unable, because “in every instance, the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers have concluded that the price obtained by the special committee 
was sufficiently attractive, that the acceptance of a settlement at that price 
was warranted.”194  Thus, the pre-MFW litigation framework facilitated “an 
implicitly collusive settlement in which plaintiffs’ attorneys, in exchange 
for defendants’ virtual guaranty of a fee award, agree to sign off on merger 
terms that at least arguably are unfair and that they might otherwise be 
successful in challenging.”195 
 
 190.  See, e.g., id. at 1815-19 (describing these aspects of the process of challenging 
going-private mergers); Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 621-22 (same).   
 191.  Weiss & White, supra note 189, at 1819.   
 192.  Weiss & White, supra note 188, at 1857 n.183.  
 193.  Cox Commc’ns, 879 A.2d at 621. 
 194.  Id.  
 195.  Weiss & White, supra note 188, at 1818.   
WILSON_FINAL (ARTICLE 7) .DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2015  5:47 PM 
2015] DESIRABLE RESISTANCE 669 
 
Similarly, plaintiffs’ attorneys are not fighting for a fair deal for 
minority shareholders.  They settle when it is profitable for them to do so––
not when the minority shareholders obtain the price that they deserve under 
Delaware law.  Sometimes these two things can converge, as is the case 
when the attorneys settle according to the price that the special committee 
agreed to and that price happens to be entirely fair.  However, unless these 
two things always converge, the pre-MFW practice of invariably settling 
according to the agreed-to price represented a selling out of the minority 
shareholders’ interests in favor of their lawyers.  If the lawyers were 
concerned about the fairness of the transaction, one would expect to 
witness at least some situations in which the plaintiffs’ attorneys reject the 
agreed-to price, refuse to settle, and continue their fight for a better deal.  
But these situations do not exist.  Thus, the standard interpretation of 
Lynch, which was challenged by MFW I, was responsible for a litigation 
system in which suits were brought to attack nearly all going-private 
mergers involving controlling shareholders, but the beneficiaries are the 
lawyers rather than the minority shareholders. 
By upholding MFW I, the Delaware Supreme Court helped correct 
these serious woes of shareholder litigation arising from going-private 
mergers.  Pursuant to Chancellor Strine’s opinion, the BJR will 
presumptively apply at the pleading stage if the controller conditions its 
going-private merger on approval by a fully empowered special committee 
and a majority of the minority shareholders.  The plaintiffs will then have 
the burden of pleading facts sufficient to rebut the BJR.196  Thus, to survive 
a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff will need to plead particularized facts 
indicating gross negligence or that MFW I’s procedural requirements were 
not met.  The latter could be done by pleading particularized facts 
indicating that:  the controlling shareholder did not condition from the 
outset the procession of the deal on approval by a special committee and 
the majority of the minority shareholders; the special committee was not 
independent; the committee was not adequately empowered to say no; the 
committee was not informed; or that the minority was coerced.197  Since 
this is far more difficult for a plaintiff to do compared to his burden under 
entire fairness, MFW II creates a desirable filtering mechanism early in the 
litigation.  Lawsuits will no longer have settlement value purely because 
there is no feasible way for the controlling shareholder to get them 
dismissed on the pleadings. 
Emanating from this will be a reduction in the number of frivolous 
lawsuits.  No longer can plaintiffs’ attorneys file suit when a controlling 
 
 196.  Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 706 (Del. 2009).  
 197.  See In re MFW S’holders. Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 535 (Del. Ch. 2013) (listing the 
necessary conditions for invoking the business judgment rule).  
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shareholder’s bare intention to go private is announced.  They will be 
forced to wait until the terms of the deal are revealed and then assess 
whether the terms are indeed unfair.  To do otherwise would be to invite 
financial ruin, as they would be investing time and energy into far too 
many suits that would be dismissed and thus not generate returns of any 
sort.  Similarly, plaintiffs’ attorneys now need to care about if the going-
private merger’s terms are actually fair or not.  They can no longer afford 
to bring suit independent of the merits of their claims and burden 
defendants who, in fact, did nothing wrong. 
Moreover, because only non-frivolous lawsuits can survive a motion 
to dismiss under the BJR, the defendant controlling shareholder responsible 
for the challenged transaction will feel pressure to pay more to obtain the 
minority shareholders’ stock.  As discussed, the current practice is for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to file suit whenever there is a going-private merger 
proposed, wait until the special committee reaches an agreement about 
price with the controlling shareholder, and then reach a settlement with the 
controlling shareholder based on that price.198  In exchange for settling, the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, without exception, declare that the price is fair and the 
controlling shareholder declares that the plaintiffs’ attorneys are 
responsible for the difference between the lower price proposed initially 
and the higher agreed-upon price.  If only meritorious suits––or suits that 
have a reasonable potential to be found meritorious––survived a motion to 
dismiss, the controlling shareholders would be compelled to offer more 
favorable terms.  They could not rest assured, as they do now, that 
whatever terms they extract from the special committee are to be blessed 
by the plaintiffs’ attorneys. 
CONCLUSION 
MFW I brought the brewing conflict between Lynch and the Siliconix 
line of cases to a climax.  Now, the Delaware Supreme Court has ruled on 
the issue.  The basic question was what standard of review applies when a 
going-private merger is (1) negotiated and recommended by a special, 
independent committee and (2) approved by the majority of the minority 
shareholders.  Yet, bound up in the answer to the question was a variety of 
important issues, such as the doctrinal coherence of Delaware case law on 
going-private tender offers and mergers, the level of protection afforded to 
minority shareholders, and the fate of this arena of securities litigation.  
This comment has argued that the Delaware Supreme Court was shrewd in 
upholding Chancellor Strine’s opinion in MFW I, since doing so was 
 
   198.     See supra text accompanying note 190.  
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beneficial on all three of these fronts.  First, upholding MFW I reconciled 
the long-brewing tension between the Siliconix line of cases, which 
supports the BJR in the context of tender offers, and the Lynch line of 
cases, which supports entire fairness in the context of going-private 
mergers.  It did so by setting a bold new precedent at the highest level in 
Delaware:  the BJR is the appropriate standard of review for both tender 
offers and going-private mergers, so long as they abide by certain 
procedural requirements to ward off coercion.  This precedent ends the 
uncertainty that existed at the chancery court on these matters, and affirms 
the sound principle that practically similar transactions should not be 
treated radically differently under the law. 
Second, by upholding MFW I, the Delaware Supreme Court 
incentivized controlling shareholders to structure their going-private 
mergers in a manner maximally protective of minority shareholders.  If 
controllers conditioned their going-private mergers on approval by both a 
special, fully empowered, independent committee and the majority of the 
minority shareholders, controllers would benefit from the BJR––a standard 
of review that they cannot benefit from now.  Therefore, controllers would 
want to take these measures, which each uniquely mitigate the risk of 
abuse.  Finally, the MFW II decision will improve securities litigation.  
Since entire fairness had, since Lynch, been entrenched as the standard of 
review for going-private mergers, the reality was that virtually any lawsuit 
challenging such mergers could survive a motion to dismiss.  Therefore, 
every single one of these lawsuits had settlement value to plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, since they knew that the defendant controlling shareholders 
would rather pay to make the case go away than to fight them through the 
discovery stage and beyond.  This led to the proliferation of frivolous 
lawsuits.  However, if, as MFW II now commands, the BJR is the standard 
of review and presumptively applies at the pleadings stage, the mere 
allegation of unfairness does not suffice to defeat a motion to dismiss.  
Instead, plaintiffs need to plead with particularity facts that indicate that the 
defendants breached their fiduciary duties and that the transaction cannot 
be attributed to any legitimate business purpose.  This filter ensures that 
only cases that are meritorious or likely to be meritorious would proceed to 
the discovery stage.  Given these advantages to upholding MFW I, the 
Delaware Supreme Court was correct to do so. 
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